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Plaintiffs") commenced this action in 1 W5

challenging the priority of the State of Utah's Medicaid lien on personal injury recoveries
M.. _ additionally sought reimbursement of attorney fees atni i«HSf- Mium I
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*tion for judgment on the

olKu-tivcIv "the State"), upholding the priority in an
1

order dated February 23, 2000 (R. 489-95). On November 13,2000, it granted the Statefs
motion for summary judgment, dismissing with prejudice the remaining claim for
attorney fees and costs (R. 703-09). Plaintiffs challenged both orders in a timely notice of
appeal dated December 13, 2000. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(j) because it is not within the original appellate jurisdiction
of the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that the priority of the State's Medicaid
lien did not violate federal law?
Standard of Review: The grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is
affirmed only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the alleged facts,
taking "them to be true and considering them and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation
Co.. 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990).
Issue preserved: Yes. The State argued in its motion for judgment on the
pleadings that the priority of its liens did not violate federal law (R. 436-40). Plaintiffs
filed a memorandum opposing this argument (R. 459-64).
2. Is the trial court's dismissal of the Class II claims with prejudice harmless error
as to the unnamed members of Class II who received no notice of the class action?
Standard of Review: In reviewing summary judgment, this Court determines
"whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed
2

issues ol* inafcnit! fact existed." Kessler v. Mortensem 2000 UT 95. r
Issue preserved: Yes. Plaintiffs opposed the State's motk
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named Plamtitls Class ll claims
Plaintiffs have expressly waived all other issues identified in the Docketing
Statement, namely, whether the trial court erred in denying Plaintiffs1 motion to amend
the .. :inplaint I» name class representatives with <. .:
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PROVISIONS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
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Addendum A
STATEMENT OF I HE CASE
Nature of the case
Plaintiffs applied for Medicaid benefits to deal pcismul IM|UI KM inflieled h\>
tortleasots. As ,i i ondilmn M| rlij'.ihililv, I'laiiitiffs assigned to the State their rights to
medic::1 :v.yments from all third parties. Pursuant to this assignment and to Utah law1, the
tci;i':a^\r> fiiv. reimbursed the State fully for the amounts of assistance piovidul n
Plaintiffs' ni;«,

vams remaining from ihr M I in m r ^ i nl to I'linnlil'K This action

'Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-5 (1998).
3

challenges the State's reimbursement priority on the ground that it violates federal law
prohibiting liens on Plaintiffs1 property. The suit also demands that the State pay its share
of attorney fees and costs incurred in recovering compensation from the tortfeasors.
The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings which upheld the State's priority.
Following Utah Supreme Court precedent, the trial judge determined that the priority of
the lien did not violate federal law because it did not attach to Plaintiffs' property. The
trial court later granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs on the claim for attorney
fees and costs, ruling that none of the Plaintiffs had an outstanding claim for fees and
costs. Plaintiffs now appeal these decisions.
Course of proceedings through first appeal
Plaintiffs commenced this action in October, 1995 and shortly thereafter moved to
certify two classes of plaintiffs (R. 1, 78-90). The State did not respond to the motion (R.
98).2 In January, 1996 the trial court signed an order certifying two classes of plaintiffs
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)3 (R. 98-101). According to the certification order,
both classes consisted of Medicaid recipients whose personal injury recoveries from
tortfeasors were reduced to satisfy the State's right to reimbursement (R. 99-100). Class I

2

Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that the State stipulated to class certification. Aplt.
Brief at 35.
3

Tracking the language of Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), the trial court's certification
order states: "There are questions of law and fact common to members of each class
which predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and a class action
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy" (R. 99). Addendum A.
4
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Houghton v. Department of Health, 90,: , ..
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State's summary judgment motion. The State then moved for summary
judgment. It contended that the Class II claims should be dismissed with prejudice
because none of the Plaintiffs had an outstanding claim for fees and costs (R. 507-08).
In opposition to the motion, Plaintiffs did not contend that they had personal claims for
fees and costs. Instead, they argued that claims of unnamed Class II members existed
independently of Plaintiffs, claims and could not be dismissed (R. 515-17). The parties
filed supporting and opposing memoranda and affidavits and the motion was submitted
for decision on June 15, 2000 (R. 507-09, 512-31, 545-87). The court heard argument on
August 9, 2001 (R. 703-06).
Plaintiffs' request for reconsideration. With their opposition to summary
judgment, Plaintiffs filed a request for reconsideration of the judgment on the pleadings
(R. 510-11). The parties fully briefed the request and the trial court heard argument on
August 9, 2000 (R. 512-41, 598-604, 703-06).
Parties' motions for protective order and to compel. In a June 21,2000
discovery request, Plaintiffs asked the State for documents "reflecting" instances in which
tortfeasors reimbursed the State for medical assistance provided (R. 603-04, 617- 20).
The State objected to producing these documents and moved for a protective order (R.
608-10). In response, Plaintiffs moved for an order compelling discovery (R. 680-89).
These motions were briefed and argued on August 9, 2000 (R. 611-20, 680-87, 698-706).
Plaintiffs' motion to amend complaint. On June 22,2000, Plaintiffs moved to
amend the complaint to add as plaintiffs persons who could assert Class II claims (R. 5906

97). The motion papers did not identify the persons who would join the suit (R. 590-97).
The parties briefed the motion and argued it on August 9,2000 (R. 590-97, 621-29,63277, 703-06).
Trial court's ruling and order. In an October 23,2000 Minute Entry the trial
court granted the State's motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiffs1 request for
reconsideration (R. 703-06). Because these determinations resolved the case, the trial
court denied Plaintiffs' motions to compel and to amend the complaint and denied the
State's motion for protective order. Id. An order reflecting the trial court's rulings was
entered November 13, 2000 (R. 707-09). There is no evidence of record that notice of the
dismissal was sent to the unnamed members of Class II. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of
appeal on December 13,2000 (R. 712-13).
Statement of relevant facts
Before commencing this action, Plaintiffs received Medicaid assistance to pay for
treatment of personal injuries caused by tortfeasors6 (R. 572-78). Plaintiff Houghton
obtained a personal injury recovery without a lawyer's help, and in August, 1994 the State
was fully reimbursed for medical assistance paid to Houghton (R. 572-74). Plaintiffs
Henderson and plaintiff Rubens hired counsel to assert their personal injury claims (R.

6

Paul Houghton received $36,687.76 to pay for injuries sustained in a 1993
automobile/motorcycle accident. Billie Henderson was injured in a 1993 automobile
accident and received Medicaid benefits totaling $4754.33. Damian Henderson was also
injured in that accident and received $11,998.57. Wayne Rubens sustained injuries in a
1989 accident and received Medicaid benefits totaling $141,579.24.
7

575-78). The State entered into agreements with them to pay a share of attorneys fees and
costs incurred in recovering from the tortfeasors. Id. By the time of the January, 1996
class certification order, the State had been fully reimbursed for assistance provided to the
Hendersons and Rubens and had paid its share of fees and costs (R. 550-53, 575-78).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State has first right to be fully reimbursed by responsible tortfeasors for
Medicaid assistance provided to treat personal injuries. Plaintiffs contend that this
priority violates federal laws that bar the State from obtaining reimbursement from the
property of Medicaid recipients. The contention fails because this Court has repeatedly
held that personal injury recoveries do not become the property of Medicaid recipients
until the State has been fully reimbursed.
Unnamed members of Class II were not given the requisite notice of this action
and therefore are not bound by the trial court's dismissal of their claims with prejudice.
The trial court's error is harmless and can be remedied by affirming the summary
judgment after modifying it to indicate that the Class II members' claims are dismissed
without prejudice. Alternatively, the Court can remand the case with instructions to
dismiss the claims of unnamed members of Class II without prejudice.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE
PRIORITY OF THE STATEfS MEDICAID LIEN DID NOT
VIOLATE THE FEDERAL ANTI-LIEN STATUTE.

This Court has held repeatedly that the State's lien does not violate the federal
8

statute that prohibits liens on the property of Medicaid recipients. State v. McCoy. 2000
UT 39, f 3, 999 P.2d 572; S.S. v. State. 972 P.2d 439,442 (Utah 1998); Wallace v. Estate
of Jackson, 972 P.2d 446, 448 (Utah 1998). Attempting to avoid this well-established
law, Plaintiffs challenge not the lien itself but its priority over their own entitlement to
personal injury recoveries. According to them, their claims and the State's reimbursement
rights arose simultaneously and therefore equally apply against the entire amount
recovered from the respective tortfeasors. Because the State's liens were fully satisfied
before Plaintiffs could share in the recoveries, they conclude that the State's priority was a
federally prohibited lien on Medicaid recipients' property.7 This argument fails because,
under this Court's precedents, the settlement proceeds did not become Plaintiffs' property
until after the Medicaid liens were satisfied.
A Medicaid recipient's right to personal injury settlement proceeds was first
addressed in S.S. There the State asserted a Medicaid lien against settlements of an
injured person's insurance claims. Conservators of the injured person contended that the
lien violated federal law prohibiting liens on the property of Medicaid recipients. Id. at
442. This Court upheld the lien, ruling that it did not violate federal law because it never
attached to the injured person's property. Id.

Plaintiffs rely on 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(a)(l) (1992), which states: "No lien may
be imposed against the property of any individual prior to his death on account of medical
assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf under the State plan....". They also rely on 42
U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b)(l) (1992), which states: "No adjustment or recovery of any medical
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made...."
9

The S.S. court recognized that the State's lien arose from the mandatory
assignment of the injured person's rights to payment for medical care from a third party.
Id. As a result of that assignment, the Court reasoned that the State's lien attached to
property of the third party rather than the Medicaid recipient. Id. at 442 (quoting Cricchio
v. Pennisi and Lind v. Town of Smithson. 90 N.Y.2d 296, 683 N.E.2d 301, 305 (1997)).
The distinction between the assets of the third party and the assets of the injured person
led the Court to conclude that the settlement money did "not legally become the property
of the recipient until after a valid settlement, which necessarily must include
reimbursement to Medicaid." Id.
The S.S. court concluded by acknowledging that its holding gives the State a
reimbursement priority over Medicaid recipients: "We conclude that the insurance
benefits were effectively assigned and the repayment of previous Medicaid expenditures
takes priority over the use of insurance benefits" by the injured person. S.S., 972 P.2d at
443.8 This acknowledgment invalidates Plaintiffs' argument that the priority question has
not been resolved.
Federal law supports the State's reimbursement priority. It requires that "any
amount" collected under the Medicaid assignment "shall be retained by the State as is
necessary to reimburse it for medical assistance payments made on behalf of an

8

Accord Wallace, 972 P.2d at 448; McCoy. 2000 UT 39, U 3 ( "SJSL and Wallace
held that under the Act, any third-party recovery does not become the 'property' of the
recipient until the recipient has reimbursed the State for all medical assistance the State
provided").
10

individual...and the remainder of such amount collected shall be paid to such
individual." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396k(b) (1992) (emphasis added). The terms "retained,"
"reimburse," and "remainder" demonstrate legislative intent to grant a priority.
The S.S., Wallace, and McCoy cases validated the State's lien and its priority over
the claims of Medicaid recipients. Because Plaintiffs fail to distinguish these holdings,
they give the Court no reason to reverse judgment on the pleadings. The trial judge
properly decided that the priority does not violate the federal anti-lien statutes.
POINT II:

IT WAS HARMLESS ERROR TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
THE CLAIMS OF UNNAMED CLASS II MEMBERS.

Unnamed members of Class II were not given the requisite notice of this action
under Utah R. Civ. P. 23. As a result, they were not afforded due process and cannot be
bound by the summary judgment. Although the trial court order erroneously states the
contrary, that dismissal is with prejudice, the error is harmless because the order will not
preclude future actions by unnamed members. Rather than reverse and remand for the
addition of a proper Class II plaintiff, the court can modify summary judgment to indicate
that the dismissal of Class II claims is without prejudice and then affirm the order as
modified. Alternatively, the court can vacate summary judgment as it applies to unnamed
members of Class II and remand with instructions to dismiss their claims without
prejudice.
A. Lack of notice invalidates dismissal of unnamed Class II members with
prejudice.
Unnamed members of Class II were entitled to two separate notices. First, notice
11

of the action was required because Class II was certified under Rule 23(b)(3). See Utah
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(e) ("In any class action maintained under Subdivision (b)(3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances....") Second, notice of the dismissal of Class II claims was mandated.
Utah R. Civ. P. 23(e) ("notice of [a] proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to
all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.")
It was Plaintiffs1 obligation to insure that notice was given. Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) ("The usual rule is that a plaintiff must initially bear
the cost of notice to the class"). Because Plaintiffs failed to do so, the requirements of
due process were not satisfied. Id. at 173-74; Workman v. Nagle Constr. Co., 802 P.2d
749, 753 (Utah App. 1990) (class action judgment void because Rule 23 notice not
given). As a result, the trial court's summary judgment bound the named Plaintiffs but did
not govern the claims of unnamed Class II members. Id.
B. Order purporting to bind unnamed Class II members is harmless error.
The summary judgment order purports to preclude Class II claims by unnamed
Class II members. It states, "Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted" and
"Plaintiffs1 Complaint is dismissed with prejudice" (R. 708). This error is harmless
because, as shown above, the order bars only named Plaintiffs' Class II claims and does
not affect unnamed class members. State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)
(harmless error does not affect outcome of proceedings).

12

C. Class II claims can be dismissed without prejudice.
The Court can properly remedy the harmless error by affirming the summary
judgment order after modifying it to state that the claims of unnamed members of Class II
are dismissed without prejudice.9 Alternatively, the Court can remand as to unnamed
Class II members with instructions to dismiss their claims without prejudice.10
D. Remand for discovery and joinder is improper.
Plaintiffs contend that the Court should reverse and remand to permit further
discovery and the addition of a proper Class II representative. They offer two grounds for
this relief. They first claim that the trial judge erroneously denied their motions to compel
and to amend the complaint. Second, they argue that summary judgment was improper
because of a fact dispute about the existence of a potential Class II representative.
Neither ground is sufficient.
(1) Denial of motions to compel and to amend do not warrant relief
The denial of Plaintiffs' motions to compel and to amend does not justify reversal.

9

E.g. Gert v. Elgin Natl Indus., Inc.. 773 F.2d 154, 159 (7th Cir.1985) (modifying,
then affirming trial court order where summary judgment was granted against named
plaintiff before requisite notice under Rule 23 was given); Smith v. Shawnee Library
Sys.. 60 F.3d 317, 325 (7th Cir 1995) (same); Friends of Chamber Music v. City and
County of Denver, 696 P.2d 309, 318 (Colo. 1985) (appeals court decertifies class
because notice not given).
10

E.g. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178 (case remanded with instructions to dismiss because
named plaintiff refused to give Rule 23 notice); Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516,1524-25
(9th Cir. 1993) (injunction reversed and case remanded with instruction to dismiss where
class had been improperly certified for lack of a proper representative).
13

First, named Plaintiffs have expressly waived the argument. See Docketing Statement at
5;Aplt.Briefat2. n
Second, remand for further proceedings on the merits would be improper because
named Plaintiffs1 claims have undisputedly failed and there is no longer an action to join.
West Valley City Fraternal Order of Police Lodge # 4 v. Nordfelt 869 P.2d 948, 952
(Utah App. 1993).
Third, the motion to amend had no merit. Realizing that they could not assert
Class II claims, named Plaintiffs moved for a complaint amendment that joined a proper
Class II representative (R. 590-97, 647-77). The proposed amendment was never put in
writing, contrary to Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1181-82
(Utah 1983) (motion to amend properly denied where the moving party fails to offer the
proposed amendment in writing). Additionally, the motion did not identify the person to
be joined and thus failed to "state with particularity the grounds therefor...." Utah R. Civ.
P. 7(b).

u

The Docketing Statement identifies the following issues: "2. Did the trial court
err in denying plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint to name class representatives
with clearly viable claims, where defendants showed no prejudice from such
amendment?....4. Did the trial court err in denying the plaintiffs' motion to compel
production on plaintiffs (sic) first request for production of documents where the plaintiff
(sic) requested evidence in defendants1 possession of monies illegally taken from
plaintiffs and defendants failed to show any grounds for a protective order, (sic)"
Plaintiffs waive these issues in their brief. They raise as issues the State's reimbursement
priority and its obligation to pay attorney fees and costs incurred in recovering
reimbursement from third party tortfeasors. Aplt. Brief at 1. They expressly abandon all
other issues identified in the Docketing Statement: "Appellants, herewith, relinquish all
other issues previously submitted for review." Aplt. Brief at 2.
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Fourth, the motions to amend and compel had no merit because named Plaintiffs
were dilatory. They knew or should have known long before the motions were filed that
they did not have Class II claims; named Plaintiffs' failure to identify a Class II
representative in the January, 1996 certification order evinces this (Addendum A).
Additionally, although class counsel claimed knowledge of persons who could possibly
represent Class II, Aplt. Brief at 38, nearly two years passed before he either (a) initiated
discovery that would identify such members, or (b) moved to amend the complaint to add
a proper representative. Named Plaintiffs acted only after and in response to the State's
motion for summary judgment. They cannot complain about dismissal when the motions
to amend and compel were last minute efforts to avoid summary judgment. See Brown v.
Glover. 2000 UT 89,ffif10, 33-39, 40-41, 16 P.3d 540 (where plaintiff had not diligently
pursued discovery, trial judge properly denied discovery motions intended to preclude
summary judgment).
Fifth, the authority on which named Plaintiffs rely, Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), is inapposite. Franks was a class action in which an employer
allegedly discriminated on the basis of race in hiring and promotion. In Franks, the
nominal plaintiffs claim became moot when he was discharged for cause during the
pendency of the action. Id. at 751-52. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the class could
nevertheless continue to prosecute the case because proper class certification had given
the unnamed class members a status independent of the named plaintiff. Id. at 755-56
("Given a properly certified class action," mootness of nominal plaintiffs claim does not
15

necessarily render moot unnamed class members1 claims).
Franks is distinguishable on two grounds. First, the class there was properly
certified and it was only after certification that the named plaintiffs claim became moot.
Here, by contrast, named Plaintiffs never had a Class II claim at the time of certification;
they therefore failed to satisfy Rule 23's certification requirements of standing,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy-of-representation. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488,495 (1974) ("[I]f none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class
establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek
relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class"); Sosna v. Iowa, 417 U.S.
393, 402 (1975) (standing required at time of certification); General Tel. Co. of the
Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147,157 and n. 13 (1982) (Rule 23 requirements not met
where nominal plaintiff does not possess claim asserted on behalf of class). Additionally,
Franks did not involve a failure to notify, whereas the lack of Rule 23 notice here released
unnamed Class II members from the effect of the prejudicial dismissal. Franks does not
warrant reversal.
(2) Fact dispute does not warrant such relief
The State's motion for summary judgment was granted because no named Plaintiff
had a claim for attorney fees and costs (R. 704-05). Named Plaintiffs now contend that
summary judgment was improper because of a fact issue about the existence of unnamed
members of Class II who had such claims. Aplt. Brief at 36-39. This argument was not
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raised below in opposition to summary judgment (R. 512-22)12 and cannot now be
asserted. Regal Ins. Co. v. Bott 2001 UT 71, f 15,427 Utah Adv. Rep. 30. Additionally,
the existence of unnamed Class II members' claims is immaterial. Class II claims were
dismissed because no named Plaintiff had such a claim; the absence of claims among
unnamed Class II members was not a basis for the judge's decision. Finally, even if it was
a basis, the error in dismissing unnamed members' claims with prejudice was harmless
because the unnamed members are not bound by summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs offer no reason to reverse judgment on the pleadings. Under S.S.,
Wallace, and McCoy, the personal injury recoveries from the tortfeasors did not become
Plaintiffs' property until the State's Medicaid lien had been fully satisfied. Therefore, the
State's reimbursement priority does not violate the federal prohibition on recovering from
Medicaid recipients' property.
Although the trial court erroneously dismissed with prejudice the claims of
unnamed Class II members, the error was harmless because the decision does not bind
class members who did not receive notice under Rule 23. The appropriate remedy is to
affirm the trial court's order after modifying the portion of the order that dismisses
unnamed members of Class II with prejudice. Alternatively, the Court should remand

12

At the trial level, named Plaintiffs did contend that the State failed to
demonstrate that none of the unnamed Class II members had claims. This is different
than the argument that a fact issue exists about whether such claims exist among the
unnamed Class II members.
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with instructions to dismiss the claims of these members without prejudice.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
AND PUBLISHED OPINION
There is no Utah Supreme Court precedent on the question whether unnamed class
members are bound by orders issued in class actions that did not comply with Utah R.
Civ. P. 23. The Court should therefore grant oral argument and publish an opinion in this
appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

day of/\W^HS5L, 2001.

^dmlK^^l^^^g:
REED M. STRINGHAMII
Attorney for Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEES this ^

day of

M b V ^ B c & O O l , to:

Robert B. Sykes
ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATES
311 South State Street, #240
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellants

19

Addenda

Addendum A

Rule 23. Class actions.
(a) Prerequisites to a class action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.
(b) Class actions maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of Subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class,
or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by order whether class action to be maintained; notice; judgment;
actions conducted partially as class actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action,
the court shall determine by order whether it is to be maintained. An order under this
subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the
merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under Subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The
notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he

so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include
all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request
exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under Subdivision (b)(1) or
(b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the
court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class
action under Subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in Subdivision (c)(2) was directed,
and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the
class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each
subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and
applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in conduct of actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the
court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or
prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of
evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the
court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the
proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether
they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or
defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the
representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to
eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action
proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be
combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be
desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.

Addendum B

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

ROBERT B. SYKES (#3180)
JAMES D. VILOS (#3333)
SYKES & VILOS, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State Street, #240
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No. (801) 533-0222

JAN 2 9 1996
Deputy Cleft

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PAUL HOUGHTON, BILLIE
HENDERSON, individually and each as
representative of a class, DAMIAN
HENDERSON, WAYNE RUBENS,
RON ROES AND SUSAN ROES,
who are other members of these classes,
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER CERTIFYING
TWO CLASSES IN CLASS ACTION

Civil No. 950907491CV
Hon. Pat B. Brian

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE
OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES,
THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES AND THE STATE OF
UTAH (THE "State Defendants"
and ROD L. BETIT, Director of the
Department of Health and Director of
Department of Human Services;
EMMA CHACONE, Executive
Director of the Office of Recovery
Services; JOHN DOES 1 - 50 and
JANE DOES 1 - 50 (the "individual
defendants"),
Defendants.
On December 15,1995, plaintiff moved the Court for an Order certifying two!
i
i

1

j classes of plaintiffs in the above-referenced action. The defendants did not respond. It

appears to the Court that the Motion is well taken because, among other things, the two
11 classes requested by the plaintiff will consist of hundreds and perhaps thousands of Medicaid
I

recipients and are so numerous that joinder of all members is impossible. Furthermore,
there are questions of law or fact common to the classes, particularly whether or not the

I

State of Utah violated federal law in asserting liens on the claims, settlements and judgments

I

of class members to reimburse itself for Medicaid assistance paid, which is the allegation of

I

the plaintiffs.

I

defenses to be anticipated, are typical of the claims and anticipated defenses of the

It further appears that the claims of the representative parties, and the

respective classes. It is also evident that these parties will thoroughly and adequately protect
j

the interest of the classes. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of

I

each class which predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and a class

j

action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the

j

controversy. The prosecution of separate actions against the state will create a significant
risk of inconsistent results against the State of Utah with different inconsistent adjudications
with respect to individual class members and incompatible standards of conduct for the

j

defendants.
Based upon the foregoing, and good cause otherwise appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

II

1.

The Court grants plaintiffs' Motion for class certification as prayed i

2.

There shall be two classes of plaintiffs.

j I the Motion.
Class I plaintiffs ai

j represented by Paul Houghton. This class is defined as individuals injured by the acts of
[j

third party, who became Medicaid recipients, and whose medical bills were paid in part 1

the State of Utah, through the Utah State Department of Health. These class members are
also defined by the fact that they had a third-party liability ("TPL") action against the
person or entity who or which injured them, resulting in the imposition or priority claim on
a lien by the State of Utah pursuant to the Medical Benefits Recovery Act, UCA §26-194,
et seq. Class I defendants are further defined by the fact that none of them had counsel inj
their dealings or negotiations with the State of Utah regarding the claim of lien, which was
paid on a first priority basis from the proceeds of their TPL claim.
3.

Class II plaintiffs are identical in every respect to Class I plaintiffs with

the following exceptions: Class II plaintiffs retained counsel and actually filed actions or
made claims through attorneys, against the liable third parties. In most or all cases, these
attorneys were involved in the negotiations with the State of Utah regarding payment of the
lien claims by the state

£

DATED this M i day of January, 1996.
/

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLf 1>AT BHBRIAfty
DISTRICT JUDGE

"*^:

j \

_.>>-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR
DECISION ON MOTION TO CERTIFY AS A CLASS ACTION served upon the parties
listed below by mailing at the address listed below by depositing the same in the United
States mail, postage pre-paid, on the 18th day of January, 1996.
Richard D. Wyss, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

#6B£RT B. SYKES
Attorney for Plaintiff

14390-Cert.cla

I'

/
'

